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The impact of domestic support on trade is likely to become an increasingly important issue
in the WTO negotiations on agriculture. Domestic support expenditures are increasing and
existing disciplines on forms and levels of support are weak. While a shift from market price
support to output subsidies should be less trade distorting, such support may not be mini-
mally distorting as required under the so-called “green-box” criteria. Proposals submitted by
WTO members could further expand permissible support measures and weaken disciplines
on their use. In some cases, most notably support provided in pursuit of environmental
objectives, there may be a contradiction between the aims of support measures and the
requirement that these should be minimally trade distorting. Clearer policy criteria and
stronger disciplines are needed in order to avoid future trade disputes on agricultural support.2
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
A
commitment to reduce certain types of government financial domestic support to agri-
culture was one of the three main components of the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture (AoA) under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded
in 1994. The other two pillars of the AoA deal with market access and export subsidies. The
inclusion of domestic support in the AoA recognized that even with a reduction in protec-
tion at the border, trade distortions could be created by domestic subsidies. 
Vol um e   2   N um be r  1 , 2 00 1/  p. 3 5 - 5 9 e s t ey j o u r n a l . c o mThe first part of this paper describes how domestic support was treated in the AoA. A
simple analytical approach is used to explore how some of the major forms of domestic
support can cause trade distortions. The relationship between domestic support policies and
trade policies is also discussed. This is followed by an assessment of the impact of the AoA
on levels of domestic support, and a review of the proposals made thus far by WTO mem-
bers on how support should be handled in the current round of agricultural trade negotia-
tions. Issues associated with the payments currently permitted under the AoA are explored,
in particular the links between payments and production decisions. Finally, some sugges-
tions are made on how progress can be made in dealing with domestic support in the nego-
tiations.
Treatment of Domestic Support 
in the Uruguay Round A g r e e m e n t
I
n the Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations, government support was classified into three cat-
egories or “boxes”: (1) “amber” (judged to have the most distorting effect on trade)—
scheduled for reduction during the implementation period of the A o A(1995–2000); (2) “blue”
(direct payments made under production-limiting programs)—exempt from reduction until
2003; and (3) “green” (minimally trade distorting)—permanently exempt from reductions.3
Although these colored categories are not actually mentioned in the AoA, it has been cus-
tomary to use them as shorthand labels in discussions on types of domestic support.
A m b e r-Box Support
The AoA specifies that amber support, measured by the aggregate measure of support
(AMS), was to be reduced by 20 percent with respect to a base period level (1986–90). The
AMS is based on the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) measure popularized by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).4
The AMS defines the amount of market price support (based on domestic-international
price wedges), “non-exempt” direct payments (on the basis of a price gap or budgetary out-
lays), and other subsidies not exempt from reduction. Levies or fees imposed on agriculture
can be deducted, and support that is not product specific is added to the total for individual
products. Support at both national and subnational levels is included. Ade minimisp r o v i s i o n
is applied, through which amber-category support that does not exceed 5 percent of the value
of production is not counted. Unlike the OECD PSE measure, which uses current world
prices to calculate support, the AMS uses fixed, base-period world reference prices (Josling,
Tangermann and Wa r l e y, 1996). Details on the calculation of domestic support are set out in
Annex 3 of the A o A .
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The identification of a blue-box category resulted from the Blair House Accord, an agree-
ment reached by EU and U.S. negotiators in November 1992. Under the accord “direct pay-
ments under production-limiting programs” are exempt from reductions if these payments
are based on fixed area, yield, or number of livestock, or on a maximum of 85 percent of a
base level of production. This wording means that U.S. deficiency payments under the 1990
Food, Agriculture and Conservation and Trade Act and the EU’s compensation payments,
which were introduced as part of the 1992 “MacSharry reforms” of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), are included as blue-box measures.
An important aspect of the blue-box category is its coverage under the due restraint pro-
vision of the AoA (Article 13). This provision specifies that payments made under the blue-
box category are exempt from the imposition of countervailing duties until 2003, unless a
determination of injury or threat of injury can be proved. U.S. deficiency payments were
abolished under the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996,
when they were replaced by production flexibility contract payments. These payments,
which are not linked directly to current volumes of production, fall under the green-box cat-
egory.5 The fact that the exemption for blue-box payments expires in three years is of great
concern to the EU. The EU has made a proposal in the current WTO negotiations on agri-
culture that the “concept of the blue box, like that of the green box, must be maintained”
(WTO, 2000f).
Green-Box Support 
The green-box category is comprised of forms of support that are considered to have no or
minimally distorting effects on production or trade. As Annex 2 of the AoA indicates,
such support must satisfy two basic criteria: (1) “the support in question shall be provided
through a publicly-funded government programme (including government revenue fore-
gone) not involving transfers from consumers; and, (2) the support in question shall not
have the effect of providing price support to producers.” In addition to these general crite-
ria, Annex 2 sets out a number of policy-specific criteria for various types of programs.
Green-box supports are not only permanently exempt from reduction but are also iden-
tified as non-actionable subsidies under the due restraint clause. This means that countries
cannot impose countervailing duties to offset the imputed effects of the subsidies on the
price of imports.
Domestic Support and Trade Distortions
A
s indicated above, the main focus of the AoA was to reduce those forms of domestic
support that have the greatest potential effect on international trade. The primary
emphasis was placed on disciplines that reduce support provided through administered
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ify the reasons for this. The left panels of the respective graphs depict supply, demand, and
prices in the domestic market for a particular commodity, while the right panels show the
parallel quantities and prices in the international market. 
In the absence of any price policy, the world and domestic prices are Pw (we can con-
sider this to be the price at the country’s border). The country produces the quantity denot-
ed by S, consumes D, and imports the difference (D-S), which is equivalent to the quanti-
ty M in the panel on the right. The curve labeled Sw depicts supply of the commodity from
exporting countries to the country concerned in response to the price at the frontier.
If an administered price of P* is introduced by the government, domestic producers
respond to the higher price by expanding production to S*, domestic consumers respond by
reducing consumption to D* and imports fall to M* (D*-S*). As a result of the fall in
imports, the price at the border—the international price—declines to Pw*.
There is a significant distortion in the country’s volume of trade as a result of this
domestic policy. Moreover, because the country is a “large country” in terms of interna-
tional trade, distortions are created in other countries whose domestic markets are open to
the world market. The fall in the volume of imports causes international prices to fall.
Exporters receive a lower price; other importers find that they pay lower prices.
Consequently, trade distortions are created in the form of lower exports and lower domes-
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Figure 1 Domestic support and trade distortions: market price supporttic prices in exporting countries, and higher imports and lower domestic prices in import-
ing countries.
Figure 2 shows what happens if instead of supporting market prices, the producer price
is increased to P* (output price support). This could be achieved by paying a producer sub-
sidy for each unit of the commodity equal to the difference between the world price and P*,
while allowing consumers to purchase at the prevailing world price. In this case, production
expands as before to S*. The increase in domestic production exerts downward pressure on
domestic and world market prices by reducing imports, but the fall in price causes domes-
tic consumption to increase. World prices fall, but by less than with equivalent market price
support. Other things being equal, the trade-distorting effect of output price support, in
terms of trade volume and international prices, is smaller than market price support—the
case depicted in figure 1. 
There is another major difference between these two policy approaches. It is only pos-
sible to operate a policy of market price support if lower-cost imports are prevented from
entering the domestic market. Without this, in figure 1, supplies could be obtained interna-
tionally at prices less than P*. A tariff or some other trade policy instrument is required to
prevent imports from undermining the domestic support price. If a tariff is used it will need
to be equivalent to P*-Pw*. 
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Figure 2 Domestic support and trade distortions: output price supportNote that domestic consumers bear the entire cost of a market price support policy by
paying more for the product (domestically produced and imported). Part of what they pay
goes to producers in the form of higher gross income. Part of that gross income goes to pay
for higher production costs and part accrues to producers as profits.6 Part of what con-
sumers pay goes to the government through tariff revenue.7 With an output price support,
domestic consumers gain from the policy since they pay lower prices than before.8 The
government has to pay the subsidy required to maintain the producer price at the support
level.
As indicated, both types of policies create distortions in the volume of trade for the
country pursuing the support policy. However world prices (and other countries) may not
be affected significantly if the country pursuing these policies accounts for a small part of
world trade.9 In that case, we can eliminate the right-hand side of both diagrams and just
focus on the left-hand side. Both policies will increase domestic supply and reduce imports,
but only market price support will also reduce consumption.
Other types of support can be provided to producers. The most common are various
forms of subsidies on inputs. If the government pays a subsidy on fertilizer, for example,
this will lower the costs of production as far as producers are concerned, causing them to
produce more at a given market price for their output. The effect will be to shift the domes-
tic supply curve to the right. This policy will have the effect of reducing imports, but will
only affect consumption if the country using the policy is a large country. In that case, the
reduction in imports will cause world and domestic prices to fall and consumption to
increase.
Figures 1 and 2 examine the case of a country that is an importer in the absence of mar-
ket or output price support. A parallel analysis can be performed for an exporter. The dia-
grams are not presented for this, but the effects of the two policies for that case can be sum-
marized as follows:
• Market price support will cause exports to rise as domestic supply increases and
demand declines. An export subsidy will be needed, equal to the difference between
the domestic price and the world price. Atariff of at least the same magnitude will be
needed to keep out lower-cost imports. If the country is a large country world prices
will decline.
•Aproduction or input subsidy will cause exports to rise. If the country is a large coun-
try world prices will decline and domestic consumption will increase in response to
the lower price.
Governments in both exporting and importing countries may use other policy instru-
ments in conjunction with production subsidies or price supports. The most important are
various forms of output-limiting mechanisms. If a binding production restraint of some type
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price support will be reduced. Thus a domestic production quota set between S and S* in
figures 1 and 2 would reduce the impact of domestic support on trade and world prices.
The most common reason for using output restraints is to reduce government costs of price
supports (direct subsidy costs, storage or export subsidy costs).
The Relationship between 
Domestic Support and Trade Policies
A
s these simple examples show, there can be an important link between domestic sup-
port policies and trade policies. Market price support will require that lower-cost
imports be prevented from entering the country through the use of a tariff or some other
instrument. An exporting country will need to use some type of export subsidy, since the
only alternative would be for the government to purchase high-cost domestic production
and store it. Such a policy is unlikely to be sustainable over the long term. 
The important conclusion is that in order to be successful, market price support must
be accompanied by complementary trade measures to prevent lower-cost imports and/or to
dispose of higher-cost domestic output on world markets. A second important conclusion
is that the provisions of the AoA to increase market access and limit export subsidies could
undermine domestic price support policies. If either or both of these parts of the AoA are
effective they will augment the amount of product that will need to be absorbed by the
domestic market and put downward pressure on prices. The government could try to
accommodate this pressure by tightening output restrictions (e.g., reducing a production
quota or increasing area set-asides) or by acquiring stocks. When these options have run
their course, the only remaining option is to reduce support prices in order to eliminate the
competitive disadvantage of domestic production with respect to the international market.
There is little evidence that the market access provisions and export subsidy restric-
tions in the current AoA have caused countries to make major adjustments in their price-
support policies. The conversion of previous protective measures into a tariff equivalent
(tariffication) under the AoA resulted in very high (often prohibitive) tariffs in many coun-
tries. The agreed reductions in these tariffs have not undermined the ability of many coun-
tries to support domestic prices. Indeed some countries have been able to regulate their
markets by applying tariffs below the bound levels under the AoA. The market access
guideline of 3 percent, increasing to 5 percent during the implementation period, also does
not appear to have had much impact on domestic support programs. In many of the key
countries, market access quotas have not been filled, and in others the guideline level of
minimum access was not provided. It is not always clear whether this is due to normal mar-
ket factors or the way market access is structured or administered (IATRC, forthcoming).
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subsidy commitment. 
Export subsidies were a key issue for the European Community during the UR nego-
tiations, and the most controversial aspect of the final agreement for its member countries.
In 1995, the EU accounted for 84 percent ($7.6 billion) of the value of export subsidies
notified to the WTO (Leetmaa and Ackerman, 1998). In 1996, the EU exceeded its value
commitment for rice and wine, and its volume commitment for rice, olive oil, beef and
wine. Since that time, the EU has had problems with other commodities, most notably
cheese. The EU argued that it was not in violation of the terms of the AoA during the
implementation period, by virtue of the fact that it was employing unused portions of com-
mitments from earlier years. It therefore viewed its unused export subsidy allowances to be
bankable. It has also made other adjustments, for example by tinkering with the definition
of processed cheese in order to be able to apply allowable subsidies to its components. In
several key commodity areas—dairy products, beef, olive oil, poultry, and fresh fruit and
vegetables, the EU has had, or has come very close to having, problems in meeting its
export subsidy commitments under the AoA.
In terms of the future, it seems clear that further reductions in the allowable volumes
and values of subsidized exports would likely force adjustment in domestic price support
programs in the EU.10 Further reductions in tariffs could also have an impact, but these
would need to be substantial reductions, such that bound tariffs would no longer be pro-
hibitively high and/or reductions in currently applied tariffs would result.
Impact of the URAA Commitment on Domestic Support
O
ne of the important features of the AoA was the recognition of the potentially trade-
distorting effect of domestic support. This was a major thrust of the work of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that contributed to the interna-
tional impetus for substantive negotiations on agriculture under the GATT (OECD, 1982;
1987). It would have been possible simply to focus on the trade measures (market access
and export subsidies) in the UR, but this would have left open unrestricted use of domes-
tic subsidies independent of border measures that have an impact on trade.
As indicated earlier, an overall reduction of 20 percent in the support provided by
amber-box measures was agreed. However, the actual impact of the reduction has been
limited for several reasons. First, the agreed reductions in support only apply to the AMS,
not to total support. There are questions about the degree of trade distortion generated by
the excluded blue- and green-box measures (this is addressed further below). Second, the
existence of the green-box category allowed countries to continue to subsidize their farm-
ers by switching support from the amber to the green box. Third, the agreed reduction in
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tion. It was possible to meet the aggregate reduction while shifting support among com-
modities.
Table 1 summarizes trends in the percentage of the AMS commitment used in select-
ed countries since 1995. Many countries have not reported their AMS figures to the WTO
for recent years and this accounts for the missing entries in the table. In particular, data for
the EU are not available for 1997 and 1998. As shown, most countries have managed to
live comfortably within their AMS commitments. Argentina exceeded its commitment in
1995, and Korea came fairly close to its commitment in 1995 and 1997. Norway gradual-
ly got closer to its AMS commitment during the period. Despite the lack of recent data, it
appears that the EU and the United States have been able to live comfortably within their
commitments.
Table 1 Use of Total AMS Commitments in Selected Countries (percent)
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998
Argentina 144 100
Australia 27 26 25 23
Brazil 28 35 30
Canada 15 12
European Union 64 67
Japan 73 72 71
Korea 95 91 95 80
Mexico 5
New Zealand 0 0 0 0
Norway 71 79 82 88
Switzerland 83 74 72 71
United States 42 26 36
Source: World Trade Organization G/AG/NG/S/1
Table 2 provides further information on trends in EU and U.S. support. In addition to
the AMS data, this table includes data on blue- and green-box support, and the producer
support estimate generated by the OECD. Recall that the PSE uses current international
reference prices in its calculation, whereas the AMS uses a fixed set of international refer-
ence prices. Of the 95 billion ECUs of support provided by the Union in 1996, 46 percent
was not subject to reduction, being almost equally divided between blue-box and green-
box support. By way of comparison, of the $59 billion of support provided by the United
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Total support in both countries rose during the second half of the 1990s. As measured by
the PSE, support in the EU was 29 percent higher in 1999 than in 1995. The increase in
percentage terms in the United States was even more dramatic, at 260 percent. Both WTO
and OECD data indicate that total support for agriculture in the EU and the United States
has continued to increase during the implementation period of the AoA.
Table 2 Green-Box, Blue-Box, AMS and PSE Support 
Levels in the European Union and the United States
Base period  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(1986–88)
European Union (billion ECU)
AMS product-specifica 73.6 49.8 50.8
AMS non-product-specific - 0.8 0.7
AMS 73.6 50.6 51.5
Blue box - 20.8 21.5
AMS plus blue box - 71.4 73.0
Green box 9.2 18.8 22.1
A M S , blue and green boxes 82.9 90.2 95.1
PSE 86.8b 100.8 93.7 99.4 110.7 108.2p
United States (billion $)
AMS product-specifica 24.7 6.3 5.9 6.5
AMS non-product-specific .9 1.4 1.1 0.6
AMS 25.6 7.7 7.0 7.1
Blue box - 7.0 - -
AMS plus blue box - 14.7 7.0 7.1
Green box 24.1 46.0 51.8 51.2
A M S , blue and green boxes 49.7 60.8 58.8 58.3
PSE 41.9 15.2 23.5 30.5 48.4 54.0p
a = including de minimis
b = EC12; other figures are EU15 
p = provisional
Source: World Trade Organization G/AG/NG/W14 and OECD PSE/CSE database
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Anumber of countries have made submissions in the current round of WTO negotiations
on agriculture that relate to domestic support.
The European Unionhas submitted a paper in support of the continuation of the blue-
box category (WTO, 2000f). The EU argues that the shift to blue-box payments has
ensured transparency and restored market balance. It states that “The market orientation of
producer decisions has been significantly improved (para. 5).” It cites unpublished empir-
ical work by the OECD Secretariat in support of arguments that its policies are minimally
trade distorting and concludes that “considering the considerable reduction in trade impact
brought about by this new type of policy support and its success in meeting domestic con-
cerns in the process of agricultural reform, the EC wishes to stress that the concept of the
blue box, like that of the green box, must be maintained (para 9).” The EU has also sub-
mitted a paper on animal welfare (WTO, 2000e). The imposition of higher welfare stan-
dards for farm animals could impose additional costs on its producers and put them at a
competitive disadvantage (Blandford, Bureau, Fulponi and Henson, forthcoming). In light
of the possible effects of new standards the EU states: “It may therefore be necessary to
consider whether it would be legitimate to provide for some sort of compensation to con-
tribute to the additional costs where it can be clearly shown that these additional costs stem
directly from the higher standards in question. For any such compensation to be acceptable,
it would have to have no or at most minimal effects on trade and production.” 
A group of developing countries submitted a proposal on green-box subsidies (WTO,
2000b). The submission is critical of the increase in total support revealed in table 2 and
the shift of subsidies into the green-box category. It argues that so-called decoupled pay-
ments are likely to increase production. The submission is also critical of the exemption
accorded to green-box payments from countervailing duties under the due restraint provi-
sion in Article 13. The countries argue that all domestic support should be collapsed into a
“general subsidies” category, and that criteria should be spelled out on what would consti-
tute legal forms of support. A common level of support should be allowed, with subsidies
that are in excess of this level by a certain amount being “actionable” (subject to counter-
vailing duties) and subsidies beyond a higher threshold being prohibited. The submission
argues for “additional flexibility” for developing countries. Such flexibility would allow
developing countries to use domestic subsidies and trade controls up to the point at which
they become self-sufficient in domestic food production.
The United States submitted a proposal for comprehensive agricultural trade reform
that includes action on domestic support (WTO, 2000c) and also submitted a note on
domestic-support reform that amplifies its suggested approach (WTO, 2000d). The United
States proposes dividing domestic support into two categories: exempt and non-exempt.
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continuation of only those measures included in the green box. In its explanatory note, the
United States sets out how the reduction in support would be applied and argues that “cri-
teria-based support measures” be included in the exempt category. These measures include:
farm income safety net and risk management tools; environmental and natural resource
protection; rural development measures; support for the adoption of new technologies; and
structural adjustment support. Since several of these measures are already included in the
current green-box category (see below), it is not entirely clear whether this would weaken
or strengthen disciplines on the use of domestic subsidies.
Future Approaches to Domestic Support
As indicated earlier, the elimination of market price support would go a long way towards
eliminating trade distortions caused by current domestic support policies. Market price
support and the trade barriers that are needed to make it work have the greatest impact on
trade, because such support simultaneously increases production and reduces consumption
in comparison to free trade levels. The issue then becomes: if we can eliminate market
price support, do we really need to worry about other forms of domestic subsidies? The
answer to this question would be in the affirmative if other forms of domestic support are
minimally trade distorting. The identification of the green-box category was an attempt to
define such minimally distorting forms of support.
Blue-Box Support
With the elimination of deficiency payments by the United States in the FAIR Act, the
major blue-box forms of support are the “compensatory payments” provided to farmers in
the EU. These payments were introduced as a result of the MacSharry reforms to the CAP
in 1992, which involved progressive reductions in support prices for cereals, beef, and
dairy products. Farmers receive compensatory payments (which seem to have become per-
manent) linked to land use for arable crops and headage for livestock. In addition, supply
controls in the form of mandatory set-asides were introduced for arable crops. The pay-
ments made under the EU program are not decoupled, since production is required in order
to receive the payments.
In its submission to the WTO on blue-box payments, the EU used some unpublished
analysis performed by the OECD Secretariat to argue that “the significant shift from mar-
ket price support to blue-box payments—resulted in a major decrease of the trade impact
of CAP support measures” (WTO, 2000f). This may indeed be the case, for the following
reasons: (1) the distorting effects of support on EU consumption have been reduced as mar-
ket price support has declined and that support has been partially replaced by direct pay-
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those in figure 2; and (2) the compensatory payments have been accompanied by the use
of production controls.
Without comprehensive analysis based on a quantitative economic model it is difficult
to provide a definitive assessment of whether the shift in the EU policy regime has reduced
trade distortions for all of the commodities concerned. This would depend on the relative
impact of the combined effect of compensatory payments and production controls on pro-
duction and the impact of the cut in market price support on consumption. 
However, a tentative assessment is possible for wheat. This was one of the most con-
tentious commodity areas due to the increase in subsidized EU exports during the 1980s.
The level of set-asides for cereals, for example, in the EU has been low in most years under
the new policy, so that the production constraints have not been large. Immediately after
the introduction of the new policy regime, the mandatory set-aside was 15 percent of the
program area. In recent years it has generally been 5 percent. Thus, while the area of wheat
harvested in the EU has declined slightly in comparison to the period before the MacSharry
reforms (table 3), production has risen due to higher yields. 
This is probably due to the continued effects of cost-reducing technical improvement,
although it may be partly due to the yield-enhancing effect of overcompensation for the
reduction in price supports provided by the compensatory payments. The consumption of
wheat, which had been depressed by the market price support policy, has increased sub-
stantially, largely due to expansion in the use of wheat for animal feed (table 3). Cheaper
wheat for animal feed has made it more competitive with other feedstuffs, particularly the
so-called “cereal substitutes” such as manioc and corn gluten feed. Thus, it seems likely
that the change in EU policy, primarily through its impact on domestic consumption of
wheat, has resulted in a reduction in trade distortions.
This being said, the issue of whether blue-box policies should continue to be allowed
remains unresolved. The issue for the future is whether the continuation of the blue box,
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Table 3 Selected Statistics for EU Wheat
Area Production Consumption / Feed use /
(million ha) (million tonnes) production  consumption
(percent) (percent)
Ave 1990–92 17.4 90.2 73 39
Ave 1997–99 16.9 98.1 88 52
Percent change -3.2 8.8 - -
Source: Computed from USDA (ERS) statisticsand the resulting policy measures that this sanctions, would be less trade distorting than
other alternatives. If the EU continued to make substantial reductions in support prices, but
also increased compensatory payments, it would eventually make a full transition from the
policy regime depicted in figure 1 to that depicted in figure 2. The trade-distorting effect
of EU policies would then be a function of the level of the output price (market price plus
compensation payment), and the output restraint. Blue-box support would continue to be
trade distorting, and would likely be more trade distorting than support involving more
decoupled direct payments.
Green-Box Support
The green box category includes several types of domestic support measures (table 4):
• general services provided to producers, for example, through research and extension,
and inspection services;
• public stockholding;
• domestic food aid;
• decoupled income support;
• income insurance and income safety nets;
• disaster payments;
• payments made as part of structural adjustment programs to promote producer or
resource retirement, or for investments to improve farm structure;
• environmental payments; and
• regional assistance.
The AoA specifies the general conditions that should apply to all these types of pay-
ments if they are to be allowable forms of support (green-box eligible). The main criteria
are summarized in table 4. In general, the criteria require that payments be transparent, tar-
geted to specific objectives, and where possible not linked directly to production decisions.
However, by their very nature some of the allowable payments are likely to influence pro-
duction and consequently trade, either by reducing production, in the case of producer or
resource retirement aid, or by increasing production, in the case of investment aids to cor-
rect structural problems. In some cases, for example environmental payments, production
could be increased or decreased depending on the conditions attached to the payment. The
criteria for allowable domestic support are clearly written with the aim that any support
provided to producers should have a minimal impact on production.
The minimal production impact requirement raises two important issues: (1) if pay-
ments are made whose primary aim or effect is to increase producer incomes, will such
payments indeed have a minimal impact on production? and (2) if payments are made to
producers in order to achieve other aims, e.g., environmental objectives, is it logical to
require these to have a minimal impact on production?
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Type of measure Main criteria
General services  Must not involve direct payments to producers or processors
Public stockholding  Volumes governed by legislated food security targets; financial 
transparency; purchase and sale at current market prices
Domestic food aid  Clearly defined eligibility criteria based on nutritional objectives; 
financial transparency; purchase and sale at current market prices 
Decoupled income   Clearly defined eligibility criteria for a fixed base period; payments
support not related to the volume of production, prices, or factors of production
in any year after the base period; no requirement to produce to receive
payments
Income insurance and   Eligibility based on income loss >30 percent of average gross income 
income safety nets for the previous three-year period or three-year average excluding
high/low from a five-year period; compensation less than 70 percent of
the income loss; no linkage to production, prices or factors of production
Disaster payments Production loss >30 percent of the average for the previous three-year
period or three-year average excluding high/low from a five-year period;
only for loss of income, livestock, land and other production factors; no
more than replacement cost and not linked to requirements for future
production; if during a disaster no more than that required to alleviate
further loss 
Producer retirement  Clearly defined eligibility criteria to facilitate retirement or switch to non-
schemes agricultural activities; conditional upon total and permanent retirement
from marketable agricultural production
Resource retirement  Clearly defined eligibility criteria to remove land or other resources from
schemes marketable agricultural production; land retirement for a minimum of
three years; slaughter or definitive permanent disposal of livestock; no
required alternative use for marketable agricultural production; payments
not related to volume of production or other resources remaining in 
production
Investment aids Clearly defined eligibility criteria to assist financial or physical restructur-
ing for objectively demonstrated structural disadvantages; payments not
based on production or prices in any year after a base period; provided
for a fixed period of time; no mandate for future production (except no 
production); limited to the amount to compensate for structural 
disadvantage
Environmental payments Part of clearly defined environmental or conservation program linked to 
production methods or inputs; payment limited to extra costs or loss of 
income caused by compliance
Regional assistance Limited to producers in objectively identified disadvantaged regions; 
payments not based on production in any year after a base period (other
than to reduce production) or prices; available to all producers in eligible 
regions; limited to extra costs or loss of income related to undertaking 
agricultural production in the prescribed area
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The first of these issues revolves around decoupling. If no production is required in order
to receive a payment from the government, will an income-support payment actually have
no impact on production? The simple answer is that it is unlikely that any government
transfer will have no production effect, but the magnitude of that effect will depend on the
conditions attached to the payment and on producer behavior. Other things being equal, the
least-distorting payment will be the one that is closest to a pure lump-sum transfer—a fixed
payment with no conditions attached. Farmers would not have to produce anything to
receive the payment; they would not even have to remain in farming. The assumption
would be that farmers receiving such a payment would make decisions on the use of their
labour and other resources (land and capital), without reference to the payment, i.e., sole-
ly on the returns that they would receive from using these resources in agriculture or else-
where.11 Whether this assumption actually holds in practice is an open question—farmers,
like the rest of us, may only be “approximately economically rational” when it comes to
the decisions they make.12
The problem is that, even assuming economic rationality, decoupled payments may
affect resource allocation decisions in farming, primarily through their impact on the funds
available to the farmer for use in the farm business.13 The payment increases the total
income of the farmer. Farmers may choose to use the income solely for consumption or to
save all or part of it for future consumption. Alternatively they may decide to invest some
or all of the extra income in the farm. The “rational”, profit-maximizing decision maker
will do this if the expected return on the farm investment is at least equal to that on com-
peting investments. However, because the funds to make this investment are costless to the
farmer when the government provides them, it is possible that the level of investment in
the farm will be higher than would otherwise be the case.14
In the absence of the government payment, funds for farm investment are obtained
either from retained profits or through borrowing. The effect of the government income-
support payment is equivalent to an increase in retained profits. It increases the ability of
the farmer to invest in the farm business, and the government payment is certainly a more
attractive form of investment capital than a commercial loan on which interest has to be
paid. Consequently, even in those cases where a maximum of decoupling in the terms of
the payment exist, there are likely to be effects on the overall level of resources used in
agriculture and the level of farm output. 
Consistency of Requiring Minimal 
Production Effects from Some Types of Payments
In some cases, one can question the logic of requiring that government payments should
have minimal production effects. The issue revolves around externalities and public goods.
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but also a range of other less tangible outputs. This is the basis of the so-called “multi-
functionality” argument (Fischler, 2000).
Some of the elements included as multiple outputs of agriculture do not have much
economic logic. For example, the role of agriculture as a generator of employment is some-
times mentioned as a component of multifunctionality. Most economists would view the
use of labour in an activity that does not appear capable of paying a remunerative rate of
return without government payments to be a problem rather than a benefit. The solution to
this problem is structural adjustment that will create sustainable economic activity.
However, even if we are to assume that there is something noble or of particular social
value about being employed in agriculture there seems little logic in paying farmers to keep
output higher just to generate a few jobs. In industrial countries, relatively little labour is
now used in agriculture; hence its contribution to employment is small. For example, only
2 percent of GDP and 2 to 4 percent of total employment in the EU and the United States
is generated by agriculture.15 In EU countries as diverse as Germany and Sweden, agricul-
ture accounts for less than 10 percent of total employment in predominantly rural regions.
There is very little evidence that agriculture is a potentially greater generator of employ-
ment than other rural activities. Public funds might be spent more effectively on address-
ing some of the infrastructural barriers to rural development in order to generate employ-
ment in rural areas, rather than on subsidizing farming and creating very little employment.
Nevertheless, there are aspects of multifunctionality that merit serious consideration.
Agriculture can be a source of public goods—goods that have no market and no price
because an individual’s enjoyment (consumption) of the good does not reduce the quanti-
ty available to others and it is not possible to prevent someone consuming the good once
it is made available.16 One might argue that some of the landscapes created by agriculture
are such a public good. Agriculture may also be a source of positive externalities—joint
products that are consumable but are not priced in the market. Thus enhanced environ-
mental quality (e.g., wildlife habitat) could be viewed as such a positive externality.17 In
both cases, it can be argued that some means needs to be found to reward producers in
order to ensure a sufficient supply of the desired goods.
In such cases, the payment of a subsidy to producers requires that production be affect-
ed to some degree. If the supply of the public good depends on there being farms in the
countryside, then the payment of a subsidy would have to be linked to farming activity in
some way. It is not sufficient to make an unconditional payment to farmers that would
allow them to abandon their farms and move to the cities, for example. The situation is
even more complicated when the public good or positive externality is associated with par-
ticular production practices or systems. In this case, the payment must be made in such a
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used. In order to avoid distortions, the payment should be directed towards the production
of the non-market good itself or to the inputs to which it is linked. This is discussed further
below with reference to specific examples.
If one acknowledges the legitimacy of these types of payments, the principle of only
permitting government payments that have a minimal impact on production, such as those
in the green box, becomes questionable. Indeed, in this case, the whole concept of such
payments inducing a production “distortion” is no longer valid. If the levels of production,
consumption, and trade are determined without taking into account unpriced but valuable
outputs, then markets are already distorted. The payment of the subsidy may simply be
needed to correct the existing distortion. The inconsistency of this logic with that underly-
ing the green box should be immediately apparent.
It is not surprising that countries who wish to limit the impact of freer trade on their
domestic agricultural sectors are enthusiastically pursuing the multifunctionality credo.
However, there are serious weaknesses in some of the arguments that are being advanced.
In general, it appears as though the assumption is being made that public goods and posi-
tive externalities in agriculture are jointly produced in fixed proportions in unique produc-
tion systems—the ones currently in place. Little consideration is being given to the possi-
bility of reducing the trade effects of internalizing the externality though changes in input
proportions or output levels within existing systems. Furthermore, little consideration
seems to be given to the possibility of achieving the desired supply of a public good or pos-
itive externality through alternative production systems. 
An example should help to make the issues clearer. It is often argued that Switzerland
needs to support its dairy industry since it is the grazing of dairy cattle on Alpine pastures
that protects Alpine flora and fauna. However, one might ask
• Does this mean that the current intensity of dairy production needs to be maintained?
Could the same ecological impact be ensured with a less intensive dairy production
system and consequently less trade distortion (less domestic milk and dairy products
that substitute for imports)?
• Does dairy production have to be subsidized at all? Could the same ecological ben-
efits be realized by allowing farmers to switch to extensive beef production or by
encouraging them to stock the hillsides with wild deer? Is it necessary to have such
conditionality on the subsidy that this will only promote a continuation of the keep-
ing of dairy cattle? 
If keeping animals on the hillsides is the secret to obtaining the desired outcome, the
central issue is: What is the most efficient way to achieve the desired effect and how can
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up to a given stocking density would be preferable to an output subsidy, since this would
minimize the incentive to increase output at the margin unless this were profitable at mar-
ket (preferably free-trade) prices. The trade-distorting effect would be limited to the resid-
ual milk, beef or venison production that is marketed from animals largely fed on grass.
The Swiss case illustrates the complexity of identifying optimal policies to achieve the
desired supply of public goods or positive externalities from agriculture, if we actually
know what the optimal supply should be (not an easy issue to resolve!). In reality, we are
likely to be faced with a range of choices among production systems and input combina-
tions within those systems that will result in the desired supply of multifunctional outputs.
The reality of spatial diversity (environmental outcomes from farm production systems are
likely to vary widely among regions, within regions, and even within farms) adds yet
another layer of complexity to policy choice. Finally, if one is faced with the possibility of
negative externalities (e.g., that alternative Alpine production systems in Switzerland may
also have differing implications for the quality of water in Alpine streams), the identifica-
tion of optimal policy becomes even more complicated. 
In reality, it is likely that there are many cases in which achieving the optimal supply
of multifunctional outputs from agriculture would require an active effort to change pro-
duction methods, rather than keep them the same. Another example can be cited, this time
from the United Kingdom. A major part of “landscape amenity” in the United Kingdom is
associated with public access to the countryside. Farming is valued not only because it
gives a particular character to the countryside, but because people like to walk through it
using the extensive network of footpaths that exists on farm land. One of the consequences
of high support prices for cereals and oilseeds under the CAP is that in parts of the United
Kingdom land that was previously in permanent or semipermanent pasture has been con-
verted to annual crops. One could argue that the supply of public goods has actually gone
down as a result of this development. Rather than having grass to walk on, people now
have muddy tracks through plowed fields for much of the year. This is to say nothing about
the impacts of intensive cereal production (with the high use of chemicals) on the popula-
tion of wild birds and biodiversity, which are clearly negative externalities from the
changes in land use. 
In the UK case, a strong argument could be made for policies that would actually tar-
get changes in production practices in order to achieve the desired supply of public
goods/positive externalities and to reduce negative externalities. In areas where the pro-
duction of cereals/oilseeds will be profitable at world prices, it might be desirable to pay
farmers to maintain footpaths (e.g., as mown-grass refuges). In the United Kingdom, farm-
ers can already obtain a payment for preserving hedgerows, and so this would not be a rad-
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planting of cereals/oilseeds, under the CAP (the blue-box subsidies) is probably a very
poor way of achieving the desired supply of public goods.
The debate on multifunctionality is particularly prominent in Europe, hence the focus
on European examples in this paper. However, the Japanese argue that rice production has
public-good and positive-externality aspects by providing a particular character to the
Japanese countryside and providing an ecosystem function as wetlands. The public-good
aspects of agriculture, particularly the provision of open space, are becoming more impor-
tant in certain parts of North America. Rapid population growth and economic growth are
creating increasing pressures for the conversion of farmland to other uses in some areas,
and this is stimulating debate on appropriate policy measures to preserve open space.
Implications for the Current Round of Trade Negotiations 
R
ecent history suggests that government efforts to transfer income to farmers will not
wither away; in fact they appear to be increasing, according to OECD figures. If this
is the case, the potential for trade distortion through domestic subsidies will also increase.
Finding ways to impose international disciplines on domestic support that will mini-
mize true trade distortions, while at the same time providing sufficient flexibility for coun-
tries to achieve legitimate domestic policy objectives, is extremely challenging. Every
country seeks to ensure that its pet programs are on the approved list, as reflected by the
country submissions to the WTO by the EU and the United States. In the opinion of this
long-time observer of trade negotiations, dealing with border measures is likely to prove
far easier in the current round than dealing with domestic support. It will be extremely dif-
ficult to reach agreement on effective disciplines to minimize the true trade-distorting
effects of domestic support.
Nevertheless, progress towards this objective might be made through the following steps:
• Strong efforts to reduce or undermine the operation of market price support.
Where price support is necessary, the aim should be to convert market price support
to an output price subsidy. The most effective way to reduce market price support
would be to achieve major reductions in the tariffs and export subsidies that make
such support feasible. Market access could be increased, if it is not possible to cut
tariffs sufficiently or prevent implicit quantitative control of imports. Special exemp-
tions should be resisted, e.g., for developing countries, that would allow WTO mem-
bers to continue to use price supports buttressed by trade restrictions. If the amber-
box category of support is maintained, a requirement to reduce such support pro-
gressively to zero commodity-by-commodity would help to ensure that market price
support is eventually eliminated for all commodities. 
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disciplines are needed on the level of payments and/or on the minimal level of pro-
duction restraints associated with these payments. Given the tendency of the EU to
overcompensate producers for changes in the CAP or the possibility that the United
States might decide to re-introduce deficiency payments in the next Farm Bill, the
potential production and trade-distorting effects of blue-box compensation need to
be controlled. Blue box payments should only be permitted if these are associated
with firm resource retirement requirements to limit their impact on production and
trade.
• Clear criteria for all green-box payments to limit production-distorting effects.
This will mean that more detailed structural and operational criteria will have to be
specified for each type of green-box policy. There are too many loopholes in the cur-
rent criteria; it is far too easy for countries to circumvent the intent of the green-box
category. The most difficult part of the process will be the specification of rules for
payments designed to ensure the supply of non-market goods since, as argued earli-
er in this paper, these payments must, by definition, involve some production and
trade effects. Nevertheless, disciplines need to be imposed on the use of legitimate
trade-affecting policies (those designed to ensure the supply of a public good or pos-
itive externality) to ensure that these are not used as trade-distorting policies.
• Introduction of a review mechanism under the WTO for all policies involving
government payments. An alternative needs to be provided to the dispute settle-
ment procedure to deal with domestic support policies that might have significant
trade-distorting effects. One way forward would be to place the onus on countries
wishing to introduce such policies to prove that they are designed and implemented
in such a way as to be minimally distorting. Since it would be impossible to specify
green-box criteria that would be sufficiently detailed to cover all the variants of poli-
cies involving government payments, a review mechanism would provide a filter
whereby such policies could be scrutinized and given a “seal of approval”. A regu-
lar review requirement would ensure that approved policy measures continue to be
implemented in a minimally distorting manner.
It seems clear that there is little possibility that the majority of WTO member countries
will accept the total elimination of domestic agricultural support in the foreseeable future.
It will also be difficult to reach agreement on firm constraints on the level of subsidies, par-
ticularly through the use of formulas that do not differentiate among types of subsidies.
However, without greater clarity on permissible forms of support and effective disciplines
on levels of support, it is likely that reductions in border protection will not bring about the
adjustments in production and trade that should otherwise result. Furthermore, allowing
55
D. Blandford
Estey Centre Journal for Law and Economics in International Tra d e56
D. Blandford
Estey Centre Journal for Law and Economics in International Tra d e
blanket exemptions from WTO disciplines for particular groups of countries will only
encourage the development of inefficient and expensive domestic support policies. There
will continue to be international tensions about the lack of a level playing field in agricul-
ture unless strong steps are taken to minimize the possible trade-distorting effects of
domestic support policies in a new WTO agreement on agriculture.
E n d n o t e s
1.  My thanks to Professor David Abler of Penn State University and Professor Richard
Boisvert of Cornell University for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Canadian Agri-Food Trade
Research Network Workshop on Agricultural Trade Liberalization: Can We Make
Progress? Quebec City, Quebec, October 2000.
3.  Earlier in the negotiations there was a red or prohibited category of support, but this
was dropped.
4.  The Producer Subsidy Equivalent has recently mutated into the Producer Support
Estimate. The two are very similar methodologically (OECD, 2000).
5.  Although these payments are not linked directly to production, this does not mean that
they do not have an impact on production. This “decoupling” issue is discussed
below.
6.  Whether or not these profits persist is an open question. Suppliers of farm inputs may
be able to extract part of the increased profits from producers if they have market
power. Food processors and retailers may be able to do the same. The higher profits
may be bid away through farmland transactions and increased land prices. It is
unlikely that protection will result in more than a transitory increase in profits for
farmers. Even under the most optimistic assumptions, the “transfer efficiency” of
price support is often very low (Blandford and Dewbre, 1994).
7.  There is net loss in domestic economic welfare equal to the sum of the two triangles
located below the supply and demand curves in figure 1.
8.  The net loss in domestic welfare is smaller, since the gain in consumer welfare—the
triangle below the demand curve—must be subtracted from the extra resource cost of
domestic production—the triangle below the supply curve in figure 2.
9.  Note, however, that if a sufficient number of “small countries” use similar types of
policies, these will collectively have a trade-distorting effect on other countries.
10. Some forms of export disposal mechanisms are not disciplined, e.g., export credits
and food aid. These would need to be included to prevent future circumvention of
export subsidy limitations.
11. The payment provides no incentive at the margin to allocate farm resources to any
particular farm or non-farm enterprise. However, the wealth effect of the payment
might cause farmers not to work when they would otherwise do so. The impact of
such payments on the economy as a whole is a complex issue, since it also depends
on the form of taxation used to finance the payment to farmers and the impact that
such taxation has on decision making by non-farmers.12. I have heard it argued that some farmers would continue to farm “until all the money
is gone”. This could happen if farmers perceive they have no viable alternatives to
farming (e.g., due to age or education) or if they wish to remain in farming because
of the utility that they derive from it. In the latter case, the farmer views farming to
be a consumption activity more than a production activity.
13. This is particularly relevant if farmers face borrowing or credit constraints, an issue
of particular importance in many developing economies. Note also that if an uncon-
ditional payment is made to a land owner who is not the farmer of the land in ques-
tion, the payment is unlikely to have an impact on aggregate farm output or the com-
position of that output. This is because a different person than the one receiving the
payment makes the production decisions.
14. Westcott and Young (2000) point out that the wealth effect of payments may also
affect attitudes to risk, enabling producers to invest in more risky crops. This could
have an impact on the total level of output and its composition.
15. Total employment in the food and agricultural system in most countries is larger than
these figures. In the United States, for example, roughly 17 percent of total employ-
ment was in this system, broadly defined, in 1996. However, only part of such sys-
tem employment is directly linked to domestic production agriculture, primarily the
part associated with input supply and immediate processing. For an analysis of
domestic agricultural policies and the food and agricultural system see Blandford
(2000).
16. These characteristics are termed non-rivalry and non-exclusivity.
17. Many policy makers who argue for agricultural support are quick to point to the posi-
tive externalities created by agriculture. They are less eager to address some of the
negative externalities, e.g., the effect of animal wastes and the use of agro-chemicals
on water quality. Control of these negative externalities may require taxes on agricul-
tural inputs or outputs. 
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